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FETAL TISSUE TRANSPLANTATION: AN ETHICAL
APPROACH TO PROPOSED REGULATORY CONTROL
LISA MELANSONt

Fetal tissue transplantation is garnering wide-spread attention as an effective
treatment for debilitating illnesses like Parkinson disease. At present, however,
the unique ethical concerns raised by a consideration of this medical procedure
have not been folly addressed in a comprehensive regulatory regime. As a result,
the rights ofall parties to the transplantation procedure-the pregnant woman,
the aborted fetus, and the recipient of the fetal tissue-have, thus for, been in adequately protected. It is therefore imperative that controls be put in place to
regulate the procurement and use offetal tissue in a manner which is particularly sensitive to the ethical issues associated with fetal tissue transplantation. A
proposed statute which establishes strict requirements for consent and anonymity
would largely eliminate the risks inherent in the transplantation procedure,
while ensuring that the benefits of the procedure remain available to those patients awaiting fetal tissue t'ransplants.

s

La grejfe des tissus des fa:tus comme traitement pour des maladies debilitantes
attire beaucoup d'attention. Cependant, les problemes morals exceptionnels
posies par la consideration de ce proct!de medical n 'ont pas jusqu 'ici ete adresses
dans un regime rt!gulateur comprehensif. Par consequent, les droits de tous les
interesses-la femme enceinte, le fa:tus avorte, et la personne qui reroit les
tissus-ont ete mal proteges jusqu 'ici. fl fout done que des controles soient mises
en place pour rt!glementer l'emploi et !'acquisition des tissus des fa:tus qui
repondent aux questions morales posies par le procedt!. Une loi proposee qui
t!tablit des exigences strictes concernant le consentement et l'anonymat
eliminerait considerablement !es risques du proct!de, tout en assurant que les
avantages du proct!de restent disponibles aux malades qui attendent la grejfe des
tissus d'un fa:tus.

t B.Sc. (Dalhousie), LLB. anticipated 1995 (Dalhousie). The author wishes to
thank Heather Sanford for her helpful suggestions.
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In the treatment of the sick person, the doctor must be
free to use a new diagnostic and therapeutic measure, if in
his or her judgment it offers hope of saving life,
reestablishing health or alleviating suffering.

The Declaration ofHelsinki
I will maintain the utmost respect for human life from the
time of conception; even under threat, I will not use my
medical knowledge contrary to the laws of humanity.

The Declaration of Geneva

The transplantation of fetal tissue into adult recipients is an intenselydebated medical procedure which is garnering increased attention.
Although this procedure is currently being employed in a number of
institutions world-wide, it raises serious ethical and legal concerns
which have not yet been fully addressed. In particular, the paucity of
legislation and jurisprudence relating to fetal tissue procurement and
use has created a rather urgent need for law-makers to develop
measures to regulate this burgeoning area of medical law.
Consequently, in this paper, I will propose a legislative model for
regulatory control of fetal tissue transplantation in Canada.
In general, when our law-makers determine that a particular aspect of society requires regulation, there are numerous approaches
which they may take in order to delineate legislation which will provide the requisite control. For example, legislative bodies may take an
economic approach in drafting enactments, so as to promote certain
economic interests, or to implement the government's economic
policies. Alternatively, legislative drafters may pursue a more human
rights-oriented approach, in an attempt to design legislation which
will protect the rights of all members of the public. It is also possible,
however, for law-makers to adopt an ethical stance to a particular
matter requiring regulatory intervention, thereby transposing into
explicit legislative terms the dominant ethical or moral view of the
subject matter which society is currently promulgating.
The subject matter of fetal tissue transplantation entails a juxtaposition of both legal and medical issues which warrant consideration
in an ethical context. Social and moral attitudes toward invasive
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medical procedures and the sanctity of human life must inevitably be
considered in a discussion of fetal tissue transplantation.
Furthermore, individuals' deeply-rooted religious and philosophical
views of the status of the fetus are, of necessity, brought to the fore
when considering the use of fetal tissue for transplantation purposes.
Due to the contentious nature of fetal tissue transplantation, it is
likely that any relevant legislation would be designed to address the
unique ethical and moral problems raised by this procedure. Hence,
it would be most appropriate if the formulators of legislation directed
at regulating fetal tissue transplantation were to take an ethical approach to the task. It is only through an examination and analysis of
the particular ethical issues raised by a discussion of fetal tissue
transplantation that legislators can ensure that the interests of all involved in the procedure will be protected, and that the inherent risks
to the participants will be lessened or eliminated.
Accordingly, this paper seeks to analyze the significant ethical and
moral issues which must be addressed when considering the subject
of fetal tissue transplantation. Taking this ethical approach to the
matter, a legislative model for regulatory control of fetal tissue transplantation will be proposed, which will reflect and, hopefully, alleviate the distinctive ethical concerns raised by this promising medical
procedure.

I. MEDICAL USES OF HUMAN FETAL TISSUE
1. Applications of Fetal Tissue Transplantation
The use of human fetal tissue in transplantation therapy is not a new
practice. As early as 1928, for example, attempts were made to transplant fetal pancreatic cells into patients suffering from diabetes. 1 Fetal
thymus transplantation to treat DiGeorge's syndrome is another
primary application of fetal tissue transplantation which is currently
in use. 2
1 M. C. Coutts, "Fetal Tissue Research" Scope Note 21, Georgetown University
(Washington, D.C.: National Reference Center for Bioethics Literature, Kennedy
Institute of Ethics, 1993) at 1.
2 M. A. Mullen, "The Use of Human Embryos and Fetal Tissues: A Research
Architecture" in Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies, Bacleground
and Current Practice of Fetal Tissue and Embryo Research in Canada, vol. 15
(Minister of Supply and Services Ottawa: Canada, 1993) at 16.

76

DALHOUSIE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES

In addition to its initial historical contributions, there has recently been rapid growth in the potential uses of fetal tissue transplantation. New, secondary uses include the clinical treatment of
such diseases as type-I diabetes (diabetes mellitus), and Parkinson's
disease.3 Some potential tertiary applications of fetal tissue transplantation include its use in treating leukemia, aplastic anemia, inherited
metabolic storage disorders such as Tay-Sachs disease, and AIDS. 4
Parkinson's disease is one of the most common neurologic disorders affecting people over fifty-five years of age. It results from the
degeneration of dopamine-secreting cells in a portion of the midbrain. The cause of this progressive and irreversible condition is unknown, and there are no treatments available that can stop or reverse
the degeneration of cells. 5 Transplantation using adult tissue is not
possible, because the process of transplantation damages mature brain
cells, which do not regenerate and cannot be kept alive. 6 However,
experiments have demonstrated that transplantation of an appropriate
suspension of fetal brain tissue into the brains of Parkinson's patients
can, in certain circumstances, restore normal brain function.7 It is
believed that the dopamine-secreting fetal cells, which are selected
from the brains of aborted fetuses, continue to produce dopamine in
the brains of transplant recipients. The fetal cells may also encourage
the recipient's own cells to produce dopamine. 8
The use of fetal cells in Parkinson's patients is not yet a proven
treatment, 9 and very limited human studies are being conducted. As
of 1993, the Victoria General Hospital in Halifax, Nova Scotia, was
the only institution in Canada carrying out research using fetal tissue
transplantation in human subjects. 10 The procedure followed by the
3

4

Ibid.
Ibid. at 18-21. The final application which Mullen notes is plastic

surgery/cosmetic treatment. This, however, is clearly beyond the ethical and
justifiable scale of uses, in most cases.
5 M. K. Elsom, "Fetal Tissue Transplants" (1992) 88 Can. Nurse 31at31.
6 G. Morgan, "The Regulation of Fetal Tissue Transplantation" (1991) 14
U.N.S.W. L. J. 283 at 285-86.
7 M. Elsom, supra note 5 at 31.
8 D. Jones, "Halifax Hospital First in Canada to Proceed with Controversial
Fetal-Tissue Transplant" (1992) 146:3 CMAJ 389 at 390.
9 Supra note 2 at 15.
IO Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies, Proceed with Care:
Final Report of the Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies (Ottawa:
Minister of Government Services, 1993) at 977.
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Victoria General Hospital in instituting its fetal tissue research program will be a point of reference later in this paper when the regulation and control of fetal tissue procurement is discussed.
The usual source of human fetal tissue for transplantation is firsttrimester abortions. 11 Fetal tissue is currently procured for research
and therapeutic use from approximately one percent of all therapeutic
abortions performed in Canadian hospitals, including the Victoria
General Hospital. 12 Although the figures seem to suggest that the
tissue available from therapeutic abortions would be more than sufficient to accommodate the need for tissue for transplantation in the
foreseeable future, 13 this assertion has been contested. Douglas
Martin, for instance, states:
Given approximately 90,000 first-trimester abortions in
Canada annually, potentially there is enough usable
aborted foetal tissue to support even an enthusiastic nationwide research undertaking. However, if FTT [fetal tissue transplantation] evolves into treatment, the number of
Parkinson's disease and diabetes patients alone, for which
FTT may be a therapeutic option, creates a tissue supply
shortage. 14

Consequently, we could reach a point in the future when our demand for fetuses from therapeutic abortions might exceed the supply.

2. Narrowing the Scope
Fetal tissue transplantation represents a broad topic encompassing a
multitude of sub-issues. This paper focuses solely on the issues surrounding transplantation of tissue removed from dead fetuses (i.e.,
dead ex utero fetuses that have already been aborted by way of therapeutic abortion) . 15 I will also assume the existence of a supply of fetal
tissue from therapeutic abortions sufficient to meet any demand for
fetal tissue. Finally, although fetal tissue transplantation is employed
to improve the circumstances of certain patients (i.e., as a type of
Supra note 2 at 7.
Supra note 10 at 986.
13 Ibid. at 989.
11

12

14

D. K. Martin, "Foetal Tissue Transplantation Research: A Canadian Policy
Analysis" (1992) 13 Health L. Can. 132 at 135.
l5 Fetal tissue cells can remain in a suitable form for transplantation for up to
several hours after an abortion, even though the fetus itself is incapable of
maintaining a heart beat and respiration. Supra note 10 at 971.
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treatment), it is not yet well-established in the health care system
(and is therefore still viewed as an experimental procedure). Hence, I
will not make any distinction between research and treatment in the
following discussion of fetal tissue transplantation.

II. ETHICALANALYSIS
The ethics of fetal tissue transplantation can be considered from a
number of different points of view. In the following analysis, the perceived risks and benefits of fetal tissue transplantation will be assessed, and the status of the fetus will be reviewed. These ethical issues will then be evaluated in terms of the general principles of
biomedical ethics. The conclusions reached in the ethical analysis can
then form a theoretical framework around which proposed future
legislation can be designed. The focus of the present analysis will be
on the ethics of fetal tissue transplantation; therefore, the complex issues relating to abortion will not be dealt with, except insofar as they
are relevant to the discussion.
1. Detrimental Aspects of Fetal Tissue Transplantation

i. Increase in the Abortion Rate
Many opponents of fetal tissue transplantation believe that induced
abortion is morally wrong, and that the use of fetal tissue from therapeutic abortions legitimizes abortion. 16 Others contend that fetal
tissue transplantation will encourage abortions which would not otherwise occur. 17 They envisage a scenario where a pregnant woman,
who is undecided about whether or not to have an abortion, proceeds
with the abortion after learning that she can help another person by
donating the resulting fetal tissue. Consequently, it is feared that the
development of successful fetal tissue transplantation therapies might
indirectly lead to an increase in the abortion rate.

u. Commodification and Commercialization ofFetuses
Plaintiff has asked us to recognize and enforce a right to sell
one's own body tissue for profit. He entreats us to regard the
human vessel-the single most venerated and protected subject
Supra note 1 at 5.
A. Robertson, "Rights, Symbolism, and Public Policy in Fetal Tissue
Transplants" (1988) 18 Hast. Cent. Rpt. 5 at 6.
16

l7 ].
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in any civilized society-as equal with the basest commercial
commodity. He urges us to commingle the sacred with the profane. He asks much. 18

In addition to ethical concerns about fetal and maternal welfare,
opponents of fetal tissue transplants have raised the spectre of a
commercial market in fetal tissue. 19 A market in fetal tissue is problematic for at least three reasons. Firstly, allowing or encouraging the
purchase of fetal tissue risks exploiting women and their reproductive
capacities, especially since it is likely that the main suppliers of such
tissue would be those who are poor. 20 Secondly, there is some concern
that the existence of a market in fetal tissue, and non-altruistic
financial motives, would provide an incentive to abort. 21 Thirdly,
paying women to abort, or to donate once they abort, along with the
commercial buying and selling of fetal tissue and products made from
fetal tissue, is generally perceived as damaging to human dignity. 22 As
Christine Overall argues, the immorality of commercial exchanges in
human fetal tissue stems from the fact that a person is not the sort of
thing which may be bought or sold. Even if the fetus is not a person,
it may eventually become one; therefore, it is not something which
ought to be bargained with. 23

iii. Coercion of Women
There is some worry that pregnant women may be pressured into
having an abortion by a physician, researcher, or sick family member-through coercion or undue influence-in order to donate fetal
tissue for transplantation. 24 It is also feared that a woman could first
be coerced into becoming pregnant, and then coaxed into having an
abortion to provide fetal cells for transplantation.

18 Per Arabian, J. in Moore v. Regents of the University of California, 271 Cal.
Rptr. 146 (Cal. S.C. 1990) at 164.
19 Supra note 5 at 31.
20 Sipra note 17 at 10.
21 A. Fine, "The Ethics of Fetal Tissue Transplants" (1988) 18 Hast. Cent. Rpt.
5 at 6-7.
22 Supra note 17 at 10.
23 C. Overall '"Pluck a Fetus from its Womb: A Critique of Current Attitudes
Toward the Embryo/Fetus" (1986) 24 U.W.O.L. Rev. 1 at 9.
24 D. Brahams, "Transplantation, the Fetus and the Law" (1988) 138 New L.J.
91 at 91.

80
tv.

DALHOUSIE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES

Unnecessary Risk to the Pregnant Woman

Although it is preferable to separate the moral issues and controversy
surrounding therapeutic abortion from the use of fetal tissue for
transplantation, it must be acknowledged that the type of abortion
does affect the usability of the tissue in treatment. As stated by
Dorothy Vawter et al.:
Abortion and procurement procedures are sometimes al tered to increase the chances of obtaining certain types of
fetal tissue. It is unknown whether such modifications in crease the risks of harm, discomfort, or inconvenience to
women, or increase the chance that tissue is removed from
living fetuses. It is also unknown whether women are informed of the modifications that will be made if they con sent to donate fetal tissue. 25

Thus, there is a fear that procurement of fetal tissue in a medicallyuseful form could expose the pregnant woman to unnecessary risk. 26
Presently, suction curettage is the safest available procedure for terminating pregnancies at the stage of fetal development optimal for
tissue procurement. Since the supply of fetal tissue by this procedure
currently exceeds the anticipated demand, there is no justification for
exposing the mother to riskier procedures in order to obtain usable
fetal tissue. 27 However, in the future, for certain treatments, gestation
may need to be prolonged, and the method of abortion may therefore
need to be altered to increase the chances of therapeutic success for
the recipient. 28

v. Unacceptable Risk to the Recipient ofthe Tissue
It must also be recognized that fetal tissue transplantation is, at present, an experimental procedure; therefore, an unsatisfactory outcome
is possible. The grafts may be without effect, or their excessive growth
could further compromise the recipient's own tissue function,
thereby exacerbating symptoms. Infection or inflammation as a result
of the surgery could also be fatal. 29 Any potential benefits of fetal
25

D. E. Vawter et al., The Use of Human Fetal Tissue: Scientific, Ethical, and
Policy Concerns (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1990) at 7.
26 Supra note 21 at 5.
2 7 Ibid. at 7.
28 M. B. Mahowald, J. Silver & R. A. Ratcheson, "The Ethical Options in
Transplanting Fetal Tissue" (1987) 17 Hast. Cent. Rpt. 9 at 13.
29 Supra note 21 at 8.
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tissue transplantation must therefore be weighed against the possibility that the treatment might not even work.

vi. Brutalization ofMedical Researchers
Some authors see the use of aborted fetal tissue as the first step down
a slippery slope leading to the creation of researchers without moral
integrity and without concern for the dignity of the research subject
or the dead fetus. In particular, Dr. Alan Fine, a key researcher into
fetal tissue transplants at the Victoria General Hospital, is very concerned with the empirical possibility that these procedures may brutalize those parties involved in carrying out the transplantations. 3o
There is further concern that the transplantation process may eventually expand to include the transplantation of tissue from living,
though nonviable, fetuses, or the transplantation of whole fetal
brains. 31

2. Beneficial Aspects of Fetal Tissue Transplantation

i. Therapeutic Use to Alleviate Human Suffering
There are undeniable benefits which can be reaped from the use of
fetal tissue in transplantation research and treatment. Proponents especially emphasize the long-awaited benefits for people suffering from
incurable illnesses, such as Parkinson's disease. 32 Three main characteristics of this disease support research into fetal tissue transplantation: the poor prognosis of patients under alternative treatments; the
great clinical promise shown by research studies into fetal tissue
transplantation;33 and the current lack of a satisfactory cure. 34

ii. Potential Risks Not Substantiated
The feared impact of fetal tissue transplantation on abortion practices
and attitudes is actually highly speculative. 35 The main motivation for

30

Ibid. at 6.

31 Supra note 28 at 14.
32 Supra note 1 at 5.
Supra note 5 at 31.
Supra note 21 at 5.
35 In fact, any risk of an increased abortion rate, commercialization of fetal tissue,

33

34

or coercion· of women has been unsubstantiated thus far in the Victoria General
Hospital transplant program: Dr. J. V. Jones (former Chair, Victoria General
Hospital Research Review Committee, 22 April 1994) [personal communication].
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abortion is the desire to avoid an unwanted pregnancy. The fact that
fetal remains may be donated for transplant will continue to be of
little significance in the total spectrum of factors which lead a
pregnant woman to have an abortion. Having decided to abort, a
woman may feel better if she then donates the fetal remains; yet, this
does not prove that tissue donation will lead to a termination decision which would not otherwise have occurred.36 Furthermore, if a
woman who aborts chooses to donate the fetal remains in the hope
that some good might result from the abortion, then paying her to
donate is unnecessary.37 In fact, assuming that the supply of fetal tissue can readily meet the demand, it is not very likely that pregnant
women will be asked to abort their fetuses for payment. Accordingly,
the development of a market in fetal tissue, although serious, is only a
mere possibility. Concerns regarding coercion of pregnant women are
also less likely to materialize in situations where the supply of appropriate fetal tissue is sufficient to meet the demand. In fact, given the
present availability of fetal tissue obtainable from therapeutic abortions, it is unlikely that there will be increased pressure for women to
donate fetal tissue for transplantation. 38 Finally, there is no indication
thus far that fetal tissue transplantation desensitizes scientists,
physicians, or nurses to the value of life. 39
It appears, then, that the potential risks often associated with fetal
tissue transplantation have not been substantiated, either in practice
or in theory. Furthermore, fetal tissue transplantations which have
been carried out to date have produced results which indicate that
this procedure may prove to be very beneficial in the treatment of
some debilitating illnesses, such as Parkinson's disease. Hence, in
light of the proven benefits produced by fetal tissue transplantation,
speculations on the presently unsubstantiated risks of this procedure
do not represent a sufficient justification for an outright ban on fetal
tissue transplantation.
3. Status of the Fetus in Relation to the Mother
Although the focus of this paper is not directed at the ethical implications of abortion, one aspect of the abortion debate is necessarily
relevant to the present discussion: the status of the fetus. It is essential
36
37
38
39

Supra note 17 at 6-7.
Ibid. at 10.
Supra note 10 at 999.
Supra note 21 at 6.
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to clarify this issue, as it will ultimately determine, in most cases,
one's feelings toward the ethical and legal issues relating to fetal tissue
transplantation. However, as the scope of this paper extends only to
those ethical issues relating to the use of fetal tissue obtained from
dead fetuses which have been therapeutically aborted, those aspects of
the abortion debate which centre on the status of the in utero fetus
will be of only marginal relevance to the present discussion. 40
Currently, in Canada, the status of the fetus and the mother is
unsettled. 41 Recent case law indicates, however, that a fetus is not a
person until it issues from the mother. 42 There are three main ethical
frameworks which specifically consider the status of the dead fetus.
Each of these frameworks is relevant to an analysis of the ethics of
fetal tissue transplantation. 43
i. The Dead Fetus as Human Research Subject

The first ethical framework views the dead ex utero fetus as a human
research subject in its own right. As a result, the dead fetus is accorded its own status, independent from its mother; therefore, it deserves to be treated with a degree of dignity comparable to that
shown to all other deceased human research subjects. Most opponents of abortion similarly consider the in utero or ex utero fetus as
having a status completely independent from its mother. According
to this conservative perspective, the fetus is in most, if not all, fundamental respects like any other human. Even though actual personhood is not fixed until birth, the humanity of the fetus, according to
this point of view, should not be overlooked. 44
It is not surprising, then, that the ethical framework which views
the dead fetus as a human research subject is often supported by those
who oppose abortion. Both perspectives view the fetus as an entity
4o For a consideration of the status of the in utero fetus in Canada, specifically in
relation to the abortion issue, see M. L. McConnell, "Sui Generis: The Legal
Nature of the Foetus in Canada" (1991) 70 Can. Bar Rev. 548; S. A. Tateishi,
"Apprehending the Fetus En Ventre Sa Mere: A Study of Judicial Sleight of Hand"
(1989) 53 Sask. L. Rev. 113; and C. Talton, "Medicolegal Implications of
Constitutional Status for the Unborn: 'Ambulatory Chalices' or 'Priorities and
Aspirations"' (1988-89) 47 U. T. Fae. L. Rev. 1.
41 Ibid.
42 See, e.g., R. v. Sullivan and Lemay (1991), 122 N.R. 166 (S.C.C.).
43 Supra note 25 at 211.
44 C. M. Meechan, "Fetal Experimentation: Protocols, Propriety and
Parameters" (1985-86) 11 Queen's L. J. 166 at 174.
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independent from its mother. Hence, both positions advocate, on
behalf of the fetus, that the dignity of the dead fetus should be accorded the same protection as that granted to other independent human research subjects.
A positive feature of this first ethical framework is that it requires
special review by an interdisciplinary group of persons interested in
minimizing risks and obtaining informed consent. 45 This protocol is
necessary if the dead fetus is to receive treatment comparable to that
provided to other human research subjects. A proxy decision-maker
must consent, on behalf of the fetus, to the procurement of fetal tissue for transplantation. The proxy is required to base his or her decision either on the basis of what the dead fetus would have wanted, or
on some view of what is in the dead fetus' best interest. 46 It is extremely difficult to see how any proxy decision-maker could rely on
either of these ethical standards in forming his or her decision.
Furthermore, proponents of this ethical framework hold that parents,
who normally serve as proxy decision-makers for fetuses involved in
research, abdicate their right to make a decision on behalf of the fetus
once they decide to abort. For example, Kathleen Nolan argues:
It would in general seem desirable to disqualify anyone
having agency in another's death from then serving as a
proxy for the purpose of making a donation. To participate
in another's death is ultimately to objectify that other, to
use the other for purposes not of his or her own. Thus,
even if one believes elective abortion can be ethically justi fied (in general, or in specific cases), maternal consent-or
indeed, societal consent-to donation still generates misgivings.47

Proponents of this view therefore conclude that all fetal tissue transplantation should be prohibited, as it is not possible to find anyone
who can formulate a proper decision on behalf of the dead fetus, and
who can rightfully serve as proxy decision-maker.
Critics of this framework maintain that the ethics of conducting
research on a living fetus are not the same as the ethics of conducting
research involving a dead fetus or its tissue. Never having walked, or
talked, or interacted with others as an individual, an aborted fetus is
45
46
47

Supra note 25 at 227.
Ibid. at 213.

K. Nolan, "Genug ist Genug: A Fetus is Not a Kidney" (1988) 18:6 Hast.
Cent. Rpr. 13 at 14.
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not identical in status to a cadaver. 48 It is argued that dead fetuses
cannot be physically or emotionally harmed, and cannot be wronged
by being the subject of research. However, the pregnant woman undergoing an abortion, who subsequently donates the resulting fetal
tissue, could be potentially subjected to both physical and emotional
harm. Hence, the woman from whom the fetal tissue is removed
should be viewed as the human research subject in need of protection, and not the dead fetus. 49 I concur with these critics that the
possibility that the pregnant woman might suffer actual harm requires that we elevate her status above that of the dead, aborted fetus
which cannot be physically or emotionally harmed.
Critics also see serious flaws in the argument that a woman who
elects to have an abortion should be disqualified from making a surrogate decision on behalf of the fetus whose life she has terminated.
Firstly, deceased persons or fetuses no longer have interests to be protected, as the notion of proxy implies. Secondly, it is contended (and
rightfully so) that it is a mistake to assume that a woman has no interest in what happens to the fetus which she chooses to abort. 5o Each
woman has her own compelling reasons for choosing to terminate her
pregnancy, and she may care deeply about whether fetal remains are
contributed to research or therapy to help others. For instance, a
pregnant woman may choose to discontinue her pregnancy because it
poses a serious threat to her life or health. The circumstances of each
woman are different, and we should not shroud the decision with
blanket assumptions which might be totally inaccurate and
misdirected.

ii. The Dead Fetus as a Cadaveric Organ Donor
There is a well-established legal and ethical tradition which provides
each person with the autonomous right to control the disposition of
his or her bodily remains after death. This right is formalized in our
provincial human tissue gift legislation.51 Such legislation requires
that consent be obtained prior to any use of the body or its parts in
medical research or therapy. Such legislation also generally allows for
4 8 J.M. Hillebrecht, "Regulating the Clinical Uses of Fetal Tissue" (1989) 10 J.
Leg. Med. 269 at 283.
49 Supra note 25 at 213-14.
50 Supra note 17 at 9.
5! See, for example, Human Tissue Gift Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 215, as am. S.N.S.
1991, c. 13.
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the disposition of remains by family members when there has been
no direct indication of the deceased' s opposition to such a donation.
Those who view the dead fetus as a cadaveric organ donor argue
that fetal tissue may be dealt with according to such human tissue gift
legislation. Adopting this framework would mean that either parent
of the dead fetus would have decision-malcing power regarding donation; the decision whether or not to donate fetal tissue would not be
the prerogative of the woman alone. 52 However, those who reject this
view of the status of the dead fetus argue that the mother is the
subject whose rights need to be protected; hence, the father or sperm
source should not have decision-malcing power, or indeed any role, in
the consent process relating to the procurement of tissue from an
aborted fetus. There is also a concern that a woman could feel coerced, or have a new incentive, to abort a fetus she would not otherwise abort if the father retained his decision-malcing power. 53

iii. The Dead Fetus as a Tissue Specimen ofthe Mother
At the liberal end of the ethical spectrum lies the viewpoint which regards the dead fetus as a tissue specimen from the mother.5 4
Proponents of this view contend that the issue of consent is
paramount in the procurement of fetal tissue for transplantation. It is
the consent of the mother on her own behalf, and not as proxy for
the fetus, which must be obtained before the fetal tissue may be procured for use in transplantation. The father does not retain any right
to veto the procurement of the fetal tissue.55
In addition, it is customary in medical practice for fetal remains,
post-abortion, to have the same moral status as that accorded any
other specimen removed from a woman during surgery. 56 This lends
support to proponents of this ethical framework who view the dead
fetus as a tissue specimen of the mother. The existence of potential
harm to the pregnant woman during the procurement process, and
the absence of potential harm to the dead fetus, also support this
ethical viewpoint.
Opponents of this framework object to viewing the fetus as a tissue specimen of the mother. They assert that the fetus is not merely a
52

Supra note 25 at 216-17.
Ibid. at 228.
54 Supra note 44 at 174.
55 Supra note 25 at 224.
56 Ibid.
53
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mass of cells which form a part of a pregnant woman's body, but is a
separate human being with its own gender and genetic identity.57
Kathleen Nolan, for example, states that "[t]reating fetal cadavers under a model that approximates routine salvage cannot help but depreciate and objectify them"; 58 a "fetus isn't a kidney, even when we act
as if it is . . . ." 59
Opponents also point to the decision in the case of Moore v.
Regents ofthe University ofCalifornia 60 in support of their position. In
that case, physicians used Moore's spleen, which had been surgically
removed, to develop a profitable cell line. The physicians did not
inform Moore that they intended to use the spleen cells for this
purpose. The Supreme Court of California found that the physicians
had breached their fiduciary duty in neglecting ro disclose personal
interests unrelated to the patient's health, and in failing to obtain
Moore's informed consent.
Although the findings in Moore are not binding on Canadian
courts, the reasoning in this case does suggest that legal thinking in
matters relating to tissue removal may be changing. In particular, the
Moore decision has arguably weakened the common law presumption
that when a patient enters a hospital, he or she implicitly abandons to
science any tissues removed during surgery.6 1
In the present context, the Moore case suggests that, at a minimum, the potential to treat specimens as property might require researchers to seek explicit consent from the mother, should they desire
to use fetal tissue for transplantation. At a maximum, researchers may
have to share with the mother any profits made from the manufacture of products using fetal cells. 62 Consequently, there is a fear that if
a dead fetus is viewed as being a tissue specimen, or property of the
mother, then women could be provided with new financial inducements to abort, or to become pregnant for the purpose of aborting

Ibid. at 226.
Supra note 47 at 17.
59 Ibid. at 19.
57
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60 271 Cal. Rptr. 146 (Cal. C.A. 1990).
61

Supra note 10 at 991.

62 For further implications of the Moore decision, see B. Hoffmaster, "Between
the Sacred and the Profane: Bodies, Property, and Patents in the Moore Case"
(1992-93) 7 I. P. J. 115, and R. W. Marusyk & M. S. Swain, "A Question of
Property Rights in the Human Body" (1989) 21 Ottawa L. Rev. 351.
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the fetus and donating the resulting tissue. 63 Nevertheless, it is this
framework which has dominated fetal tissue procurement. 64
As indicated earlier, the pregnant woman, and not the dead fetus,
may potentially be harmed, either physically or emotionally, by the
procurement of fetal tissue. As well, the pregnant woman, and not
the dead fetus, is accorded certain rights at law. Each of these views is
consistent with the third ethical framework, which requires that the
mother's consent be obtained before fetal tissue is procured, and
which denies the dead fetus any moral or legal status above that of all
other tissue specimens removed from the mother. Thus, I think it is
appropriate that the tissue from a dead, aborted fetus be viewed as a
tissue specimen from the mother's body.

4. Principles of Biomedical Ethics
In their text, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 65 Beauchamp and
Childress adopt a deontological perspective of biomedical ethics, and
set out four primary rules according to which acts or decisions in the
biomedical field may be judged. These four principles are: autonomy,
nonmaleficence, beneficence, and justice. The preceding ethical analysis will now be considered in light of these four principles.
Autonomy is generally viewed as the primary principle which
cannot easily be overridden by the other three principles. Unlike
many contentious issues, however, the principles of beneficence and
autonomy are not directly in conflict here, because it is not universally-accepted that fetal tissue transplantation is a beneficial and socially acceptable form of treatment. As well, the benefits of such
treatment do not directly accrue to the parties who might be required
to consent to the donation of fetal tissue-the mother and/or the fetus. Hence, the benefits and risks of the procedure are initially
weighed in order to determine if fetal tissue transplantation is inherently beneficial. Concluding that such transplantation should occur,
the principle of autonomy (and its requisite consent) is discussed,
followed by a review of relevant justice issues.

63 Unril either legislators or courts address issues such as those in Moore, the
Canadian position in this area will remain unclear: Marusyk & Swain, supra note
62.
64 Supra note 25 at 228.
6 5 T. L. Beauchamp & ]. F. Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 3d ed.
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1989).
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i. Beneficence
The principle of beneficence reflects an obligation to actively confer
benefits, and to balance the possible benefits against the possible risks
of a procedure. 66 The main positive aspect of fetal tissue transplantation-the treatment of persons with debilitating and incurable diseases-weighs heavily in favour of such a medical procedure. The
treatment does appear to be successful in many instances, and, thus
far, there do not appear to be any serious side effects. Furthermore,
there are currently no other alternatives to the treatment of serious
neurologic disorders like Parkinson's disease. 67 The lack of other
treatment options therefore increases the intrinsic beneficial value of
fetal tissue transplantation.
It is evident, then, that fetal tissue transplantation can make a
difference in certain patients, especially those with Parkinson's disease. Thus, unless the risks dramatically outweigh the benefits of this
treatment, fetal tissue transplantation should be pursued. The possibility of benefit to persons suffering from disease suggests that there is
an ethical obligation to proceed with such treatment, providing that
it can be done without harm to others.

ii. Nonmaleficence
The principle of nonmaleficence reflects an obligation of non-infliction of harm. 68 In terms of fetal tissue transplantations, there are a
number of parties who might be harmed by this medical procedure,
including future fetuses, the pregnant woman, the recipient of the tissue, and researchers. It is essential that researchers and physicians ensure that they are not inflicting unnecessary harm on any of these
parties before the procedure should be promoted. The fetus whose
tissues are actually procured cannot be harmed in the context of this
discussion, as I am focusing solely on the use of tissue taken from a
dead fetus which has already been aborted. 69
It is conceivable that harm to future fetuses might arise under the
guise of an increase in the abortion rate, possibly coupled with the
66
67
68

Ibid. at 195.
Supra note 21 at 7.
Supra note 65 at 120.

69 Some, of course, would argue that the dignity of the dead fetus, as a potential
human being, may still be harmed by tissue transplantation. However, as I have
adopted the position that the status of the dead fetus is equivalent to that of the
mother's tissue specimens, the conservative view of the dead fetus is not persuasive.
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commodification and commercialization of fetal tissue, or coercion of
an undecided mother into having an abortion. However, it has been
noted that these fears are perhaps exaggerated. Furthermore, it is
quite possible to mitigate any of these nebulous risks through proper
legislation or regulation. For instance, a complete prohibition on the
sale of fetal tissues and products made from fetal tissue, and on the
payment to women from whom the tissue is obtained, can ensure
that commodification and commercialization of fetal tissue do not
occur. 70 It has also been suggested that any discussion of the use of
fetal tissue for research should be deferred until after the woman gives
informed consent to the abortion.7 1 This can help prevent coercion of
the pregnant woman, and ensure that tissue donation does not lead
to a termination decision which would not otherwise have occurred.
Coercion can also be diminished through a prohibition on designation of the fetal tissue recipient. 72
Similarly, any physical risk to the pregnant woman or to the
eventual recipient of the fetal tissue can be lessened or alleviated by
requiring voluntary, informed consent from both parties.73 If the researchers and physicians fully disclose to both the pregnant woman
and the tissue recipient the potential risks of the procedure, and allow
these individuals the freedom to make their own decisions, then the
voluntary choices of these autonomous patients cannot be questioned. Finally, it has been suggested that harm might come to researchers involved in fetal tissue transplants, in the form of brutalization. This, again, is a rather elusive fear, and has not yet been substantiated. 74
Taken as a whole, then, the obligation upon physicians and researchers not to inflict harm is trumped by the benefit conferred
upon seriously ill patients by the process of fetal tissue transplantation. The existence of alternatives or safeguards to alleviate the risks,
and the current absence of alternative treatments to assist sufferers of
chronic disorders, justify the introduction of fetal tissue transplantation into the Canadian health care system. It must now be determined what consent, if any, is required before fetal tissue may be procured, and from whom consent should be obtained.
70 Supra note 10 at 1002.
7 1 Ibid.

at 997.

Ibid. at 999.
73 Supra note 21 at 7-8.
7 4 Supra note 21 at 6.
72
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iii. Autonomy
According to Beauchamp and Childress, the principle of autonomy
encompasses a number of requirements, including the right to refuse
treatment, the right to consent to treatment, the right to have full information so that autonomous decision-making can be fostered, and
avoidance of coercion. 75 In the context of fetal tissue transplants, the
issue of consent is most relevant. One's view of the status of the fetus
ultimately dictates which party should be providing consent to the
procedure, and on whose behalf the consent is given.
If the status of the fetus is equated with that of other tissues in
the mother's body, it is dear that only the mother's consent is relevant to a determination of the eventual disposition of the fetal tissue.
There is no decision-making role for the father within this ethical
framework.7 6 Furthermore, the mother is providing this consent on
her own behalf; her consent is not given as a surrogate decision on
behalf of the dead fetus. What degree of consent is required before
fetal tissue may be procured for the purposes of transplantation?
Assuming the pregnant woman retains the right to determine
whether fetal tissue is used for transplantation, the main ethical goal
is to ensure that her choice about the abortion, and her decision regarding tissue donation, are both "free and informed." 77 Firstly, the
woman must be fully informed of the use to which the fetal tissue
may be put. Secondly, it is essential that there be a dear separation of
the decision to abort and the decision to donate, so that tissue donation is not seen as a prerequisite to the performance of an abortion.
This will reduce the chances that the pregnant woman will be coerced
into either obtaining an abortion, or donating the resulting fetal tissue. In addition, the physician performing the abortion, and the person requesting consent to tissue donation, should not be involved in
the subsequent tissue procurement and transplantation procedures, a
constraint widely followed in cadaveric organ procurement.7 8 This
can also serve to counteract any opportunities for coercion, and thus
ensure that the pregnant woman makes a fully autonomous choice.

Supra note 65 at 73.
The position of the father or sperm source is relevant to the decision whether
or not to abort, and has formed the basis of many Supreme Court of Canada
rulings on abortion: See, e.g., Tremb!dyv. Daigle, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 530.
77 Supra note 17 at 9.
78 Supra note 17 at 9.
75

76
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If there is a dear separation between the decision to abort and the
decision to donate, researchers would be unable to alter the type of
abortion which a woman will undergo, as there would be no mention
of the procurement of fetal tissue until after the abortion consent
form has been signed. Consequently, the researchers and physicians
will have to be satisfied with the gestational age of the fetuses which
are produced, and the quality of the tissue provided. They will therefore be unable to request that the pregnant woman undergo a certain
type of abortion procedure which might expose her to unnecessary
risks. However, assuming that the supply of usable fetal tissue is adequate to meet the demand, the possibility that a woman may be asked
to undergo a more dangerous type of abortion is virtually eliminated.
iv. justice

The principle of justice is generally perceived in terms of fairness and
claims of entitlement.7 9 Although this paper assumes a constant
supply of fetal tissue sufficient to meet the demand, problems of distributive justice, and allocation of public resources, might arise under
conditions of scarcity of fetal tissue. Absent any current regulatory
mandate, there is a potential for development of a demand for fetal
tissue which exceeds the supply. It is therefore necessary to put into
place restrictions which ensure that the health of the mother remains
the paramount concern, and that scarce fetal tissue is not procured at
any cost. It is also necessary to take into consideration the potential
for the development of a bio-commerce in scarce fetal tissue. A fetus
is, arguably, a "regenerative" tissue, as it can, in general, be created at
will; thus, it is particularly suited to commodification. The principle
of distributive justice requires that scarce resources be allocated to
those who need these resources the most-not necessarily to those
with the greatest financial means. Therefore, regulations must be put
in place to prohibit both the sale of fetal tissue and products made
from fetal tissue, and the payment of women in exchange for aborted
fetal tissue.
Given the controversial nature of the use of aborted fetal tissue,
allocation of public funds to such research is presently unlikely.
Although legislators have not prohibited fetal tissue transplantation
thus far, conscious ignorance is not an adequate response to the issue.
Fetal tissue transplantation therapy is still a last resort for patients
79
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who have not responded to, or have rejected, alternative treatments.
Yet, it is still a valid concern that treatments dependent on a supply
of fetal tissue may become the primary method for treating a particular disease, to the exclusion of standard treatments. It is therefore essential that future legislators remain cognizant of the potential uses of
fetal tissue in transplantation in order to accurately assess the allocation of public funding, and to ensure a just distribution of limited resources.

III. CURRENT AND PROPOSED REGULATORY
CONTROLS

It is dear from the ethical concerns raised in the previous discussion
that some standards are needed to regulate fetal tissue transplantation. The following legal analysis will initially consider what regulation currently exists. The adaptability of present regulatory controls
will then be evaluated to determine if they are sufficient to deal with
the ethical problems created by fetal tissue transplantation.
Legislation enacted in jurisdictions other than Canada will be reviewed briefly, in order to gain some insight into the potential for
legislative regulation in the area of fetal tissue transplantation. Finally,
in employing and implementing the ethical requirements set out in
the ethical analysis, the type of law needed to regulate fetal tissue
transplantation will be proposed.
1. Current Regulation of Fetal Tissue Transplantation
The procurement and use of fetal tissue is not currently regulated in a
comprehensive manner by any level of government in Canada. Thus,
guidance must be taken from existing provincial human tissue gift
legislation, provincial health legislation regulating the disposal of
abandoned tissues, national guidelines for research involving human
subjects, and internal policy guidelines established in institutions
where abortions and/ or procurement of fetal tissue tal<:e place.
i. Human Tissue Gift Legislation

Currently, human organs and tissues are acquired and utilized
according to provincial legislation, such as the Nova Scotia Human
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Tissue Gift Act. 80 Statutes of this kind attempt to ensure that existing
rights are recognized; appropriate consent is obtained; the sale of
human tissues is prohibited; and anonymous, equitable distribution
occurs. Such legislation does not specifically include fetal tissue.
However, in the Manitoba and Prince Edward Island legislation,
fetuses are specifically excluded from the definition of "tissue." 81

ii. Provincial Health Legislation
Regulations enacted under existing Nova Scotia and New Brunswick
hospital legislation do, however, refer to tissues removed from a patient during the curettage procedure. 82 These regulations generally
provide for the disposal of fetal tissue in a manner similar to that used
for other abandoned tissues. Nevertheless, neither regulation considers the actual procurement and use of fetal tissue for transplantation
purposes. Hence, there is a gap in the legislation relating to this area.

iii. National Research Guidelines
The Medical Research Council of Canada (MRC) is a pseudo-governmental agency which regulates funding for medical research. This organization is viewed as a "special interest group," and is comprised of
basic scientists and physicians who have professional interests in medical research. 83 In 1987, the MRC issued a set of guidelines that apply
to the conduct of medical research. Compliance with these guidelines
is necessary where the research is funded by the federal government. 84
Under the heading of "Research on Fetuses," the MRC Guidelines
state:
Separated tissue and placental material may be regarded as
routine pathological tissue, and may be used in research,
subject to the permission of the mother whenever possible
80

R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 215, as am. 1991, c. 13; see also Human Tissue Act,
R.S.N.B. 1973, c. H-12, as am. S.N.S. 1984, c. 25; S.N.S. 1986, c. 44; S.N.S.
1990, c. 61; S.N.S. 1992, c. 52, and the Human Tissue Gift Act, R.S.O. 1990,
c. H-20.
81 See Human Tissue Act, S.M. 1987-88, c. 39, s. 1 and Human Tissue Donation
Act, R.S.P.E.I. 1992, c. 34, s. l(g).
82 See N.S. Reg. 16/79 enacted pursuant to Hospitals Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 208,
s. 17, and N.B. Reg. 92-84, s. 45, enacted pursuant to Hospital Act, S.N.B. 1992,
c. H-6.1, as am. S.N.B. 1992, c. 52.
83 Supra note 14 at 138.
84 Supra note 10 at 993.
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and to provincial human-tissue-gift legislation and hospital
regulations. 85

This might suggest that the procurement and use of tissue obtained
from a dead, aborted fetus is acceptable according to Canadian policy
standards.

iv. Institutional Policy Guidelines
At present, in the absence of any mandated consent processes, each
individual institution involved in fetal tissue transplantation must assess for itself the ethical issues relevant to the procedures, and monitor itself accordingly. Any need for obtaining informed consent to the
procurement and use of fetal tissue will be determined by the internal
ethics committee's views on the status of the dead fetus. However, by
convention, these institutions generally look to the MRC Guidelines
for guidance. There are no other published guidelines for human
biomedical research in Canada; thus, the use of the MRC Guidelines
does not necessarily reflect a voluntary decision on the part of these
institutions. 86
To date, it appears that the Victoria General Hospital is the only
hospital in Canada which has approved an internal policy relating to
the procurement and use of fetal tissue.87 According to Dr. J. V.
Jones, 88 former Chair of the Victoria General Research Review
Committee, a woman must provide voluntary, informed consent before she can obtain an abortion. After her consent has been given to
the abortion procedure, the pregnant woman is then asked if she can
be approached by someone responsible for obtaining consent with respect to the procurement of fetal tissue. If the woman agrees, she is
approached by that individual (who is not one of the researchers or
physicians involved in the transplant procedure), and asked if she will
consent to the use of the aborted fetal tissue in a transplantation ex periment. The woman is made aware of the details of the transplantation procedure, and is in no way pressured to give her consent. If
the woman consents to the procurement of the fetal tissue, she is then
asked to sign a second, separate consent form, which has been approved by the Research Review Committee. Thus, the cornerstone of
85

Medical Research Council of Canada, Guidelines on Research Involving Human
Subjects (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1987) at 32.
86 Supra note 14 at 133.
87 Supra note 14 at 133.
88 Personal communication, (22 April 1994).
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the Victoria General Hospital procurement process is the free and
informed consent of the pregnant woman, obtained subsequent to,
and separate from, the consent to an abortion.
2. Adaptability of Existing Regulatory Controls

The present human tissue gift legislation balances the rights of an
individual over his or her body with the potential benefit to others
conferred by either inter vivos or post-mortem donations of organs
and tissues. Although fetal tissue is not specifically included in this
legislative scheme, it could be argued that, by analogy, the intentions
of the legislation must be deemed to apply to fetal tissue transplantation. This interpretation would at least ensure that some measure of
consent to the use of fetal tissue is obtained from a pregnant woman
who is about to undergo an abortion.
However, the distinction between inter vivos and post-mortem
donations becomes confused when applied to the situation of a living
mother donating tissue obtained from a dead fetus. If the procurement of tissue from a dead fetus is deemed to be a post-mortem donation, then the legislation allows persons other than the mother to
consent to the use of the tissue. Yet, I have chosen to view the status
of a dead fetus as being equivalent to that of a tissue specimen taken
from the mother; therefore, only the mother should be able to provide consent to the procurement of fetal tissue. Can the donation
therefore be considered an inter vivos gift? The answer to this question is not clear, and there is no indication in the legislation as to
which type of donation would best accommodate the procurement of
tissue from a dead fetus.
Even if human tissue gift legislation could be adapted for fetal tissue transplantation, there is no provision to protect against coercion
of a pregnant woman, nor does the legislative scheme address any of
the other unique and complicated issues presented by the use of fetal
tissue. Furthermore, as D. K. Martin suggests, human tissue gift legislation applies only to persons; 89 since the Supreme Court of Canada
and relevant case law have indicated that a fetus is not a person,9° the
legislation should not apply directly to the fetus, and might not apply
to surrogate consent by the mother on the fetus' behalf. Finally, any
modification of this legislation would require a considerable number
89 Supra note 14 at 132-33.
90
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of alterations.9 1 Hence, the existing human tissue gift legislation is
not adequate to meet the special regulatory requirements of this area
of tissue procurement.
The existing regulations relating to disposal of abortuses are also
not sufficiently adaptable to provide a comprehensive regulatory
regime for the procurement of fetal tissue for transplantation. The
regulations merely leave it up to the hospitals to dispose of the tissue
according to the dictates of their internal policy guidelines. More
specific legislative or regulatory directions which address issues such
as informed consent to the use of fetal tissue, and which are cognizant
of the potential exploitation of pregnant women and fetuses, are required.
According to the MRC Guidelines:
At this time, the legal status of embryos and fetuses is not well
defined, nor is the social consensus. While issues of consent and
autonomy may not therefore apply, clear ethical concerns arise
from the unarguable fact that embryos and fetuses are human life
forms. 92

This uncertainty would suggest that these Guidelines also do not
provide an adequate response to the unique ethical questions raised
by the concept of fetal tissue transplantation. Furthermore, the
Guidelines are directed primarily at research on embryos and in utero
fetuses. Hence, they do not contemplate the procurement of tissue
from dead fetuses. In addition, because fetal tissue transplantation is
not currently supported through public funding, the Guidelines do
not strictly apply.93 Clearly, there is a need in Canada, in the wake of
increasing incursions into the realm of fetal tissue transplantations, to
establish firm regulatory controls which can ensure that all parties to
the procedure are properly protected.

3. Regulation in Other Jurisdictions
i. Australia

According to the report of the Australian Medical Research Ethics
Committee, it is acceptable to use aborted fetal tissue for research or
therapy, as long as the fetus does not attain a gestational age of 20

9!
92

93

See for example, Morgan, supra note 6 at 297-301.
Supra note 85 at 32.
Supra note 14 at 133.
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weeks and does not exceed 400g in weight. Research protocols must
be approved by a properly constituted ethics committee, and the
abortion procedure must be completely separate from the tissue procurement process. Consent of the mother and, where practicable, the
father, is required. The intending researcher is not permitted to approach the pregnant woman to solicit consent to the procurement of
the aborted fetal tissue. 94
ii. Britain
Current British guidelines for fetal tissue research stipulate that the
pregnant woman's consent to undergo an abortion must be kept separate from her consent to donate the resulting fetal tissue. No direct
contact is allowed between the abortion clinics and the tissue researchers,95 and there should be no financial reward for donating fetal
tissue. 96
iii. Sweden
In Sweden, provision guidelines allow tissue to be taken only from
dead fetuses. The pregnant woman must give her informed consent,
and the decision to donate should not in any way affect the method
or timing of abortion. 97
iv. The United States
In every state, the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act allows the donation of
fetal tissue or organs provided that there is documented parental consent. 98 However, eight states have laws which prohibit the experimental use of dead fetal tissue obtained from induced abortions.99
The U.S. House of Representatives has also recently passed Bill H.R.
2507 which requires, firstly, that a woman who has agreed to donate
fetal tissue certify that she did not have an abortion with the intent to
donate the tissue; and, secondly, that this certification be kept on file
by researchers involved in fetal tissue research. These two require9 4 ].

Gunning, Human !VF, Embryo Research, Fetal Tissue for Research and
Treatment, and Abortion: International Information (London: H.M.S.O., 1990) at
13.
95 Supra note 1 at 3.
96 Supra note 10 at 1012.
97 Ibid.
98 Supra note 94 at 44.
99 See, for example, Illinois Abortion Law of 1975, II. S. C. 510/ 12.1.
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ments have been hotly contested, as they are viewed as an invasion of
the woman's privacy, and a violation of her rights to autonomy and
confidentiality. Ioo

4. Proposed Model for Regulatory Control
We are very conscious of the need to address the many
ethical and social questions raised by fetal tissue use and to
safeguard against the possible risks of coercion, commercialization, and the promotion of abortion. IOI

The serious ethical concerns raised by a discussion of fetal tissue
transplantation indicate that some form of regulatory control of this
procedure is needed. There are currently no directly applicable national guidelines or policy statements which sufficiently deal with the
matter; nor is the existing legislation properly adaptable to meet the
unique problems raised by fetal tissue transplantation. Hence, we
cannot address all of the concerns raised by this issue by maintaining
the status quo. It is possible to modify the existing human tissue gift
legislation so that it can specifically include fetal tissue. However, the
unique and complex ethical questions generated by a consideration of
fetal tissue transplantation cannot be sufficiently addressed by such
an amendment.
Therefore, I propose that a new statute be enacted to deal with all
matters relating to embryos, fetuses, and reproduction (that is, those
issues dealt with by the Royal Commission on New Reproductive
Technologies). One section of this new statute would specifically address the use of aborted fetal tissue for medical purposes.
Consequently, there would be a number of provisions expressly
dealing with the issue of fetal tissue transplantation.
It is possible that such proposed legislation could be viewed as
falling under either the federal or provincial legislative jurisdiction, as
provided in sections 91 and 92 of the Constitution .102 The legislators
might choose to tie the subject matter of the statute to the creation of
crimes under the federal Government's jurisdiction over criminal law,
in subsection 91 (27) of the Constitution. Alternatively, the legislation
could be framed so as to fall within the federal Government's residual
100 W. Kearney, D. E. Vawter, & K. G. Gervais, "Fetal Tissue Research and the
Misread Compromise" (1991) 21 Hast. Cent. Rpt. 7.
101 Supra note 10 at 990.
102 Constitution Act, 1867 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Viet., c. 3.
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powers relating to peace, order and good government, in section 91
of the Constitution. Either approach would allow for the creation of a
federal regulatory scheme relating to fetal tissue transplantation,
similar to that favoured by the Royal Commission on New
Reproductive Technologies.103
A less controversial route is to frame the legislation in such a way
as to ensure that it clearly falls within the provinces' jurisdiction over
health, under the head of "property and civil rights" in subsection
92(13) of the Constitution. Such provincial legislation would focus on
the protection of relevant rights and interests, as opposed to the creation of penal sanctions.
Specifically, the new legislation should set up restrictions which
will protect all of the parties to the fetal tissue transplantation procedure. A prominent section on consent should delineate the essential
requirements for a free and informed consent. As with the Victoria
General Hospital consent process, the pregnant woman should not be
approached for the purpose of procuring the dead fetus' tissue until
after she has consented to have an abortion. This is also consistent
with the consent processes in both Australia and Britain. This ensures
that abortion management is clearly separated from the procurement
of fetal tissue. Unlike the Australian consent process, however, only
the consent of the mother should be required (although I offer no
opinion as to whether or not the father should have the right to consent to the preceding abortion).
As with the Australian consent process, neither the physicians nor
the researchers involved in the ensuing transplantation operation
should be permitted to solicit from the pregnant woman any consent
to tissue procurement; rather, the pregnant woman should be approached by a neutral party, so as to protect the woman from coercion. In addition, the pregnant woman should be prevented from
designating the recipient of the fetal tissue, and the researchers should
not be permitted to name the potential recipient of the tissue, if he or
she is known. This, too, will help prevent coercion of the pregnant
woman, and diminish any possibility of fetal tissue harvesting for
friends and family members.
Bernard Dickens suggests that the prevention of tissue designation can be approached by either criminal or non-criminal sanctions
against prospective donors, or indirectly by regulation of health pro-
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fessionals or facilities. 104 I favour the latter as most pregnant women
who elect to have abortions are in vulnerable positions. The pregnant
woman therefore should not be punished when it is really those in
positions of superiority, or those who owe her fiduciary obligations,
who should be held responsible for coercing her into designating the
recipient of her fetal tissue. Hence, no certification of ethical intent
should be required, as in the proposed U.S. legislation.
The transplantation procedure should be explained to the pregnant woman so that her voluntary decision is also informed. However,
there should not be any need to explain the possibility of additional
risk to the woman, as such risk should be non-existent. Since consent
to donate cannot be solicited until after the woman has consented to
a particular abortion procedure, the researchers will be unable to request a different, and perhaps more risky, abortion procedure which
might produce more medically-useful fetal tissue. Consequently, the
researchers and physicians involved in the transplantation procedure
must be content with the type of abortion to which the woman has
previously consented. Future fetuses should be protected through a
prohibition on the sale of fetal tissue and products made from fetal
tissue. This will ensure that a bio-commerce in fetal tissue does not
develop. As well, there should be a prohibition on payment to a
pregnant woman in exchange for aborted fetal tissue. This can help
prevent both the establishment of a market in fetal tissue and the coercion of pregnant women.
Finally, the new legislation should include a provision directed at
the recipient of the fetal tissue. The transplantation procedure should
not be allowed to proceed until the treatment is fully explained to the
recipient, and all material risks are disclosed. As well, there must be
standards which ensure that a recipient is not coerced into receiving a
fetal tissue transplant. The transplant operation therefore should not
occur until both the pregnant woman, and the recipient of the fetal
tissue, have given free and informed consent.
The relevant part of this proposed legislation might take the following form: 105

104 B. M. Dickens, "Legal Issues in Embryo and Fetal Tissue Research and
Therapy" in Research Volumes of the Royal Commission on New Reproductive
Technologies (Ottawa, 1992) 43.
l05 For another variation, see supra note 48.
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An Act Respecting Abortion, Embryo Research, and the Use of
Fetal Tissue for Research and Treatment

PartX
Procurement and Use of Tissue from Therapeutically-Aborted
Fetuses

Consent by Donor
1. (1) Any legally competent woman undergoing a therapeutic
abortion may donate the aborted fetus or its tissues. Hereafter,
any such legally competent woman who donates her aborted fetus
shall be referred to as a "donor."
(2) Informed consent, in writing, is required from a donor before
her aborted fetus, or its tissues, may be procured and used for
medical research or treatment.
(3) Consent to the procurement and use of an aborted fetus, or
its tissues, may not be solicited from a donor until after she has
given free and informed consent, in writing, to the abortion procedure.
(4) No person engaged in carrying out a transplantation procedure under Part X of this Act shall be permitted to solicit consent
to the procurement of an aborted fetus or its tissues.
Prohibition Against Designation
2. (1) No person shall request a donor to specifically designate the
recipient of tissue donated under Part X of this Act.
(2) No donor shall designate the recipient of tissue donated under
Part X of this Act.
(3) The name of the recipient of tissue donated under Part X of
this Act shall not be disclosed to the donor.
Prohibition Against Commercial Exchange or Payment
3. (1) It shall be unlawful to knowingly engage in any sale or commercial exchange of aborted fetuses or fetal tissue or products
made from fetal tissue.

FETAL TISSUE TRANSPLANTATION

103

(2) It shall be unlawful to provide payment to any donor in exchange for the procurement and use of the aborted fetus or its tissues.
Consent of the Recipient
4. No transplantation procedure under Part X of this Act shall proceed until the informed consent, in writing, of the recipient undergoing such transplantation procedure has been obtained.

IV. CONCLUSION
Legislation cannot resolve all of the problems in today's complex society. However, the unique ethical concerns raised by an analysis of
the issues relating to fetal tissue transplantation deserve the special attention of legislators. New legislation should be drafted to regulate
the procurement and use of tissue obtained from dead, aborted fetuses. This new regulatory regime can fill the lacunae which currently
exist in the law. The new enactment should address previously overlooked issues, such as the requirement for voluntary, informed consent from both the donating mother and the tissue recipient, avoidance of coercion, and prohibitions on the commodification and
commercialization of fetuses and fetal tissue. It is hoped that as the
medical technology in this field of research continues to advance and
improve, and that the regulation of such research may similarly advance and improve, thereby providing legal protection to all who
might be affected by this contentious technological procedure.

